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ABSTRACT

"Judges should apply the law, not make it." That plea appears
perennially in American politics. American legal scholars belittle it
as a simple-minded demand that is silly and misleading. A glance
beyond our shores dispels the notion that the American public IS
naive to expect judges to apply rather than to make law.

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. J.D.
Cornell, LL.M. Georgetown, Ph. D. in Law (Dr. jur.) Ludwig Maximilian University
Munich. This essay is based on a presentation and submission to Panel 4: Imagining New
Structures of Civil Justice (Including a Comparative Review) of the Common Good
Forum "The Boundaries of Litigation, A Forum Addressing the Alignment of Civil
Justice with Social Goals," held at the Brookings Institution, Washington DC, April 15,
2008, and commissioned by the Common Good organization. The author would like to
thank the Common Good organization and Philip K. Howard for their support, as well as
the other members of the panel, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Lord Leonard Hoffmann,
Professor Gillian K. Hadfield, Mr. Robert E. Litan, Professor Peter H. Schuck, Professor
Anthony J. Sebok, Professor Lars Triigardh and Judge John M. Walker. The views
expressed are those of the author.
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American obsession with judicial lawmaking has its price:
indifference to judicial law applying. If truth be told, practically we
have no method for judges, as a matter of routine, to apply law to
facts. Our failure leads American legal scholars to question whether
applying law to facts is a necessary feature of civil procedure at all.
German civil justice does have a method for routinely applying law
to facts. It is called, in German, the "Relationstechnik," that is, in
English, literally "relationship technique." This article introduces it
to American lawyers and judges and shows how it helps make
German civil justice effective.

"Judges should apply the law, not make it." That plea appears
perennially in American politics. I American legal scholars belittle it as a
"simple-minded demand,,2 that is "silly and misleading.") It is, they
suggest, a product of lay naIvete. "[E]very lawyer knows that judges
make law-it's their job.,,4 That the plea finds resonance, however, is
symptomatic of a popular perception of misalignment of civil justice with
social goals. If law is not applied, but is left to judges to be made, it
cannot be the expression of the people's social goals that it should be. 5
A glance beyond our shores dispels the notion that the American
public is naIve to expect judges to apply rather than to make law. An
Englishman, H.L.A. Hart, reminded U.S. jurists that "conventional legal

1. Compare 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 502 (Robert Green McCloskey ed.,
1967) (1804) ("[E]very prudent and cautious judge ... will remember, that his duty and
his business is, not to make the law, but to interpret and apply it.") with Press Release,
George W. Bush, President Announces Judge John Roberts as Supreme Court Nominee,
(July 19, 2005), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/
releases/2005/07/20050719-7.html ("He will strictly apply the Constitution and laws, not
legislate from the bench.").
2. John J. Flynn, "Making Law" and "Finding Facts" - Unavoidable Duties of an
Independent Judiciary, UTAH B.J., Aug. 6, 2005, at 6, 7, available at
http://www .utahbar.orglbarj oumal/pdf/2005 july_august. pdf.
3. Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, Judges Do Make Law-It's Their Job,
USA TODAY, August 24, 2005, at IIA.
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., Justice Stephen J. Breyer, A Conversation on the Relevance of Foreign
Law for American Constitutional Adjudication with U.S. Supreme Court Justices
Antonin Scalia & Stephen Breyer (Jan. 13, 2005) (transcript available at
http://domino.american.eduiAU/mediaimediarel.nsf/ I D265343BDC2189785256B81 007
I F238/1F2F7DC4757FDOI E85256F890068E6EO?OpenDocument) ("The judge is to
apply the law .... [R]emember, a judge is a person who's been entrusted in a democratic
society with power, although that judge is not elected. So if in fact you give judges too
many open-ended procedures, rules and practices, what you will discover is that a man, a
woman who suddenly has this power, for better or for worse, maybe unconsciously,
maybe not even wanting to, will substitute her judgment, his judgment, for the judgment
of the legislature. And that's wrong in a democracy.").
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thought in all countries conceives as the standard judicial function the
impartial application of determinant existing rules in the settlement of
disputes.,,6 Nowhere, except perhaps here in the United States, has the
recognition that some judges, sometimes, make law, shaken the
conventional idea that the standard function of civil litigation is applying
law to facts. And even here, that shaken faith is a relatively recent
development.
American obsession with judicial lawmaking has its price:
indifference to judicial law applying. We use our methods of applying
law to facts-e.g., jury trials, summary judgments, and complaint
screening-haphazardly rather than routinely. We rely on the parties'
lawyers to determine the subject for decision rather than on judges. We
depend upon those parties, rather than on courts, to invoke mechanisms
for deciding. As a result, trials are vanishing, summary judgment
motions are sporadic, and complaints are rarely reviewed by courts
before service. It is said of American civil justice that the "highest goal
is for courts not to apply law to facts.,,7
If truth be told, practically we have no method for judges, as a
matter of routine, to apply law to facts. Our abject failure leads
American legal scholars to question whether applying law to facts is a
necessary feature of civil procedure at all. In their view, process and
participation in the process are primary; decisions that determine rights
according to law are secondary, at best, and impossible to achieve, at
worst.
The Common Good Forum on the "Boundaries of Litigation" held
last year at The Brookings Institution challenged us to "Imagin[e] New
Structures of Civil Procedure." How can we do that? "Imagining" truly
new structures of civil procedure is a daunting challenge beyond anyone
person's capabilities. One way that we can imagine new systems without
stretching our imaginations beyond the breaking point is to observe other
legal systems.
In this essay I discuss the German method of judicial application of
law to facts. Our two societies and our two legal systems are sufficiently
similar to make their experiences mutually relevant and informative.
Above all, the two systems of civil justice are united by a common goal:
"the fair, accurate and efficient vindication of private rights and interests
based on the existing legal, political and social order."g

6. H.L.A. Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare
and the Noble Dream, 11 GA. L. REv. 969,971 (1977).
7. Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 989 (1987).
8. PETER L. MURRAY & ROLF STORNER, GERMAN CIVIL JUSTICE 575 (2004).
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German civil justice does have a method for routinely applying law
to facts. It is called, in German, the "Relations-technik," that is, in
English, literally "relationship technique.,,9 In this essay I introduce it to
American lawyers and judges. After a brief presentation of the
Relationstechnik, I show how it helps keep German civil justice-as
Philip Howard might say-"sane,,,10 by guiding litigation.
THE RELA TJONSTECHNIK OF ApPLYING LAW TO FACTS

The syllogism is the basis of the Relationstechnik: the legal rule is
the major premise, the facts are the minor premise, and the judicial
decision is the logical conclusion. The Relationstechnik is taught to all
future German judges and lawyers in court-provided training that takes
place after conclusion of their university studies. The Relationstechnik is
a product of more than a century of judicial practice.
Two "bookends" of the Relationstechnik guide judges in applying
law to facts: the legislatively-promulgated statute (das Gesetz) and the
judicially written judgment (das Urteil).
The statute is the fundamental concept of all German law. German
statutes take the form of syllogistic norms. The major premise is that a
legal consequence prescribed by statute applies when a generally
described state of facts is present. The minor premise is that a particular
state of facts fulfills the statutorily prescribed state of facts.
The Relationstechnik works best when statutes in substance and
form are good. Bad statutes make bad decisions. When statutes reflect
prevailing conceptions of justice, the Relationstechnik is spared the
tension of choosing between statutory rules and justice. II When statutes
are well drafted, the Relationstechnik functions smoothly; hard cases are
few, and easy cases are many.

9. The Relationstechnik is little discussed in English. To my knowledge, until
2004, the only work was Walter O. Weyrauch, The Art of Drafting Judgments: A
Modified German Case Method, 9 J. LEGAL EDUC. 311 (1957). For two recent works, see
also Christoph Engel, The Impact of Representation Norms on the Quality of Judicial
Decisions 16 (Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods, Working Paper No.
2004/13, 2004), available at http://www.mpp-rdg.mpg.de/pdCdat/2004_13online.pdf;
Lutz-Christian Wolff, Structured Problem Solving: German Methodology from a
Comparative Perspective, 14 LEGAL EDUC. REV. 19 (2003-2004), available at
http://www.ler.edu.aulpdf/volumes/ler_vo1l4_1_2003_04.pdf. The paucity of Englishlanguage treatments may be attributed to the fact that the method is principally taught at
the courts in the practical training period of German legal education rather than in the
university law faculty.
10. See Philip K. Howard, Making Civil Justice Sane, CITY JOURNAL, Spring 2006,
at 64.
11. Article 20(3) of the German Constitution binds judicial decisions to "statute and
justice" (Gesetz und Recht). GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 20(3) (F.R.G.).
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Well-drafted statutes coordinate well with each other. Well-drafted
statutes make clear who may invoke them and what the consequences of
their invocation are. Well-drafted statutes, to the extent possible, have
judges find objective facts rather than make subjective valuings. Welldrafted statutes do not expect judges to make political or other social
policy decisions. While well-drafted statutes often require judges to
value individual equities and find subjective facts such as state of mind,
they minimize the use of such decisions to the extent they can. When
they cannot avoid such decisions, they guide those decisions by setting
boundaries and by giving examples.
Statutes are not drafted well by accident. Most modem legal
systems have a central office responsible for the technical quality of
statutes. In Germany, preparation and perpetuation of good legislation is
the raison d'etre of the Federal Ministry of Justice. 12 In that work, the
Ministry engages some of the land's the best-qualified jurists: fonner
appellate judges.
While statutes guide law application, judgments validate their
correct application. Judgments have four parts: (1) a caption that
identifies the parties and the lawsuit ("Rubrum"); (2) a statement of the
decision and of the relief ordered ("Tenor"); (3) a Tatbestand;13 and
(4) the grounds for decision ("Entscheidungsgriinde"), hereafter referred
to as the "justification." All four parts are subject to strict rules as to
style. The first two parts need no explanation; the last two do.
The Tatbestand is a short statement of the parties' legal claims and
of their assertions of fact. It is not a finding of facts and thus is not an
analogue to the findings of fact of an American bench decision. The
Tatbestand should include: the subject matter of the lawsuit, a detailed
sketch of the facts, but only insofar as is necessary to establish clearly the
subject of the lawsuit, the evidence offered by the parties, the
applications of the parties, relevant history of the lawsuit, and specific
references to the file. It should not include: facts not necessary to the
12. The Ministry's website identifies its central mission: "Law constitutes the
foundation of our free democracy. Guaranteeing the rule of law and pursuing further
refinements in this area is a central task of legal policy, and thus also of the Federal
Ministry of Justice. The legislative work undertaken by the Ministry pursues this
objective, and encompasses the preparation of new legislation as well as the amendment
or repeal of existing laws." http://www.bmj.bund.de/enid/9fUca4S6efff7ed197073e2dd
Sd372aS,OIMinistryIStructure_and_Organisation_14p.html.
13. Tatbestand is a legal term which has no single English translation. Depending
upon the context in which it appears, a different English translation is appropriate. In this
essay, Tatbestand refers to a specific part of a German judgment that is so designated.
There is no formal counterpart to the Tatbestand in an American judgment. To avoid
inducing a false understanding, it is left here in the original German. Readers should note
that this meaning is different from the Tatbestand of German criminal law, which might
be translated "elements of the offense."

474

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 114:2

decision of the case, party statements made in the proceedings that are no
longer relevant, legal arguments of the parties, statements of the law, or
normative evaluations of the facts.
The justification applies law to facts. It determines the facts of the
Tatbestand and subsumes them under the abstract elements of the
applicable rules. The process of applying law to facts is not a
mechanical act of mindless processing, but a mindful act of creative
evaluation.
The justification follows a format that in clarity and brevity
facilitates understanding. It begins by stating the result of the lawsuit
and by identifying the determinative legal rule. It confirms or denies that
the plaintiffs claim is permissible under procedural law and wellfounded in substantive law. For example, a typical justification might
begin: "The plaintiffs action is in all respects permissible and wellfounded. Pursuant to § 488 Paragraph 1 Sentence 2 of the Civil Code the
plaintiff has a right arising from the loan agreement of December 12,
2007, to repayment of the loan of€75,000."
The justification then proceeds to address systematically the
applicable rule, its elements and, if the judgment denies plaintiffs
claims, all rules that might support any of the claims. For each element
of the rule, insofar as necessary, the justification clarifies the legal
definition of the element as it relates to the particular case. Here the
justification may interpret the applicable statute, but only to the extent
directly relevant to determining whether the facts in the present case
fulfill the elements of the statutory norm. Abstract discussions of law
have no place.
The justification then tells the factual story of the case. It focuses
on those facts material to decision of the case. Immaterial facts have no
place in the justification except as is necessary to understand the court's
decision. The justification starts from undisputed facts. Where facts are
disputed, the justification evaluates the evidence that leads the court to
decide as it does. The justification does not discuss burden of proof
other than with respect to material facts in dispute.
Once the justification has clarified material and disputed facts, it
subsumes those facts under the identified and clarified rule.
The judgment certifies that the procedure has fulfilled constitutional
guarantees. These guarantees include that every exercise of state power
has been justified by and grounded in statute, that the parties were heard,
and that the parties received equal treatment under law. The judgment is
an act of an impartial and impersonal public authority furnishing the
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official and objective interpretation and application of law. 14 It helps
parties understand why the court decided as it did. Ideally it convinces
losing parties that the outcome is legally correct; at a minimum, it
demonstrates that the process was rational.
THE GERMAN JUDGMENT AS "NARRATIVE"

Recent American writing on civil procedure conceptualizes
contemporary American trials as a form of narrative, or more accurately,
as a form of presentation of "two competing narratives. . . where an
'either-or' choice will have to be made." The narrative is how we
"actually organize and analyze the vast amounts of information involved
in making a legal judgment.,,15 In this terminology, the German
judgment is the narrative of German civil proceedings.
The difference between German and American proceedings
narrative-wise is that the German judgment presents "the standard
narrative historiography, where there exists a single account of
events ... ," while contemporary American proceedings present two fully
formed and competing narratives at trial that have been developed
pretrial. No wonder, then, that German civil procedure is more efficient
than is its American counterpart; where American proceedings write two
screenplays and produce both screenplays jointly in one trial, German
civil procedure records only one report for posterity and does not even
bother to dramatize it. While the German cinema is poorer for the
paucity of scripts, the German legal system is richer in determinations of
right.
The efficiency of German civil procedure does not end in it making
one unproduced screenplay do where American procedures create and
produce two. The monopoly position of the German narrative avoids the
excesses of competing narratives. The German narrative focuses on that
which is legally material. It does not battle for the reader's imagination.
It does not bring into its story legally immaterial, but humanly appealing,
detail. It does not leave out legally material matters that do not
contribute to its justification. It is concerned with the validity of its
conclusions. It has no cause to seek deconstruction of a competing
version of events on grounds unrelated to the validity of those
conclusions.

14. See Reinhard Zimmermann, Characteristic Aspects o/German Legal Culture, in
I INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW, 26-27 (Mathias Reimann & Joachim Zekoll eds.,
2005).
15. Robert P. Bums, The Distinctiveness o/the Trial Narrative, in I THE TRIAL ON
TRIAL: TRUTH AND DUE PROCESS 157 (Anthony Duff et aI., eds., 2004).
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The writer of the narrative in German civil procedure is the judge.
The judge is assigned the task to write the story of whether the plaintiff
has established facts that fulfill all of the elements of a statutory right.
The parties provide the judge with the materials the judge needs for that
work. The goal of their cooperation is a decision according to law. The
individual elements required by statute to establish a claim are the
"spectacles" through which the judge views the case. What the judge
can see through the spectacles matters; everything else is immaterial. 16
The "sporting theory of justice" is no model for German court
proceedings; there is no trial by battle between competing champions.
There is little theater, ceremony is sparing, courtrooms are modest and
judges preside from an altitude of a few inches rather than from a height
of a couple of feet. Parties and their attorneys talk directly with the
judge and with each other. The atmosphere is more cooperative and less
confrontational than that of their American counterparts. German court
proceedings resemble joint projects such as assembling a jigsaw puzzle,
completing a crossword puzzle or conducting a scavenger hunt. The
principal difference between these joint activities and German court
proceedings is that in court one party wants to establish that one piece is
necessarily missing!
THE RELATIONSTECHNIK AS GUIDE TO ApPLYING LAW TO FACTS

The Relationstechnik bounds legal proceedings without straitjacketing them. It avoids the two extremes of American civil procedure:
the single-issue focus of historic common law special pleading and the
legally unfocused narrative of contemporary notice pleading. It brings
about issue narrowing without cutting off the right to be heard. The
"golden rule" of German civil justice is that there are no surprise
decisions. 17
We discuss here four of the ways in which the
Relationstechnik sets boundaries to litigation and keeps civil justice
aligned with social goals: (1) reviewing the complaint for plausibility
before serving; (2) case structuring through issue framing; (3) focusing
witness testimony; and (4) deferring issue deciding.

16. JOACHIM HRUSCHKA, DIE KONSTITUTION DES RECHTSFALLES: STUDIEN ZUM
VERHALTNIS VON TATSACHENFESTSTELLUNG UND RECHTSANWENDUNG 23-24 (1965).
17. Helmut RiiBmann, Grundregeln der Relationstechnik (Jan. 14, 2005),
http://ruessmann.jura.uni-sb.delzpo2004Noriesungirelationstechnik.htm.

2009]

IMAGINING JUDGES THAT ApPLY LAW

477

(1) Reviewing the Complaint for Plausibility before Serving

The Relationstechnik together with the cost system 18 help keep
lawsuits that are unfounded in fact or law or that are procedurally
defective from being served on, and thus from disturbing, potential
defendants. The plaintiff begins a lawsuit by filing a complaint with the
court. Before the court serves the complaint on the defendant, it assigns
the case to a judge who makes a preliminary review of the complaint for
procedural prerequisites and other patent deficiencies. Already at this
stage the Relationstechnik anticipates the judgment that is to come. The
plaintiff must plead a case that has a plausible chance of success. While
the plaintiff need not plead the legal basis on which the complaint rests,
the plaintiff must plead facts upon which relief could be granted.
Moreover, the plaintiff must plead the proof that the plaintiff intends to
rely upon to prove the factual assertions, i.e., the plaintiff must
"substantiate" the complaint's factual allegations.
A properly
substantiated complaint includes all material documents in the plaintiffs
possession, designates all material documents in the possession of others,
and identifies the testimony on which the plaintiff plans to rely. It should
state the facts so exactly that, based on the information provided, the
court could determine that the claimed legal relief should be granted.
The judge's preliminary review of the complaint impels plaintiffs'
counsel to ground complaints in existing law and in facts that counsel has
a reasonable chance of proving. The expectation of preliminary review
helps deter frivolous complaints. Yet that review should not deter many
meritorious complaints, since plaintiffs do not plead at their peril.
Should the judge have concerns about whether the procedural
prerequisites are met, or about whether the complaint sufficiently
substantiates the factual allegations, the judge is to direct the plaintiff to
clarify the point before dismissing the case. 19 Moreover, while it is the
plaintiffs responsibility to plead the facts, it is up to the judge to know
the law and to identify the applicable legal rule. In Germany, as in other
civil law countries, the maxims jura novit curia (the court knows the
law) and da mihi factum, dabo tibi ius (give me the facts, I will give you
the law) apply. So long as there is any legal rule that would support
relief on the facts alleged, the judge is to direct service of the complaint.
The plaintiffs incorrect choice of rule is of no moment.

18. In Gennany, the loser pays. Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO][Civil Procedure
Statute] Jan. 30,1877, § 91, ~ I.
19. See Michael Bohlander, The German Advantage Revisited: An Inside View of
German Civil Procedure in the Nineties, 13 TuL. EUR. & CIv. L.F. 25, 33 (1998); MURRAY
& STORNER, supra note 8, at 210.
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Once the judge directs service and the defendant is served, the
defendant is required to answer the complaint. The defendant's answer
is subject to requirements similar to those governing the complaint: it
must be true, complete, specific, and substantiated.
(2) Case Structuring through Issue Framing

Coincident with the preliminary review, the judge determines how
the case is to proceed further, whether the case will use additional written
proceedings or will use a so-called early first hearing. The judge's
choice is purely pragmatic; the judge selects the method that the judge
thinks is most likely to be more efficient in the case. A party dissatisfied
with the choice may request that the judge use the other method, in
which case the party should state why the party believes that the other
method would be more efficient. The determinant of efficiency is
ordinarily which method is more likely to simplify and hasten framing of
the material and disputed issues. The judges with whom I have spoken
have told me that most judges prefer an early oral hearing in contested
cases.
Prior to the first hearing, or the exchange of further written
pleadings, as the case may be, the judge is required to prepare for the
future proceedings. Preparations may include: (1) directing the parties
to supplement their pleadings, (2) directing government authorities to
provide information and documents, (3) ordering the personal
appearance of the parties, (4) summoning witnesses named by a party to
the hearing, and (5) ordering the production of documents or tangible
things and making premises available for observation. In some cases,
based on these preparations, it is possible to resolve the entire case at the
first hearing.
In this stage the judge structures the lawsuit without finally deciding
anything. The judge works with the parties to identify those issues that
both are material to plaintiff's claims and that are in dispute. This early
structuring of the case through issue framing plays an important role in
keeping German civil justice within bounds. It identifies the legal rules
under consideration for application, the elements of those rules, and the
evidence necessary to establish the elements of each rule. The judge
points out weaknesses to the parties in their particular claims and
inquires of them how they plan to meet those claims.
Structuring the case and framing issues not only guides the judge in
subsequent consideration of the case, it also helps the parties reach a
settlement of the case more expeditiously and reasonably. The parties
can see which rules will determine the decision and which facts are
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needed. Some judges told me that they consider structuring one of their
most important judicial duties.
To an American accustomed to very formal exchanges between
judge and counsel, the early first hearing to clarify issues is remarkable.
By American standards, these hearings are intensely interactive,
comparatively cooperative, and informa1. 20 They resemble American
pretrial conferences more than American trials. They differ from
American pretrial conferences, however, in important ways. Most
remarkable from an American perspective is the role of the parties.
Typically the judge summons the parties themselves to the early first
hearing and speaks directly with them. These hearings are neither
American-style discovery nor American-style tria1. 21 Their focus is on
identifying material issues of fact that are actually in dispute between the
parties; it is not on uncovering unknown facts, or on proving known
ones, or on possible presentation of a narration later. 22 The judge probes
the potential claims and the facts needed to support the claims. In
essence, the judge turns to the concerned party and the party's attorney
and asks: "Now on this issue are you seriously going to dispute the
fact?"
What prevents the party or the party's attorney from responding: so
let the other side prove it? The German Code of Civil Procedure
("ZPO"). ZPO § 138 imposes on parties a duty of cooperation in
clarifying the issues in the case. ZPO § 138(1) requires the parties to
give their declarations concerning factual circumstances completely and
truthfully; ZPO § 138(2) requires that they state their positions with
respect to the facts asserted by the opponent. These discussions are not
evidentiary. They do not constitute taking testimony of the parties. They
amount to clarification of the factual assertions of the parties that are
necessary for the eventual application of the law to the facts. ZPO
§ 138(3) provides that an asserted fact will be treated as admitted if the
other party is silent and fails to contest it. ZPO § 138(4) provides that
only in limited circumstances does a declaration of lack of knowledge
serve to put a matter in dispute. Moreover, ZPO § 138(2) is interpreted
20. Murray and StUmer describe them at some length. MURRAY & STORNER, supra
note 8, at 256-59.
21. See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., American Law Institute Study on Paths to a

"Better Way": Litigation Alternatives, and Accommodation: Background Paper, 1989
DUKE L.J. 824, 854 n.l09 (incorrectly so characterizing the hearing).
22. Cf Frederick D. Wells, A Justice Factory, JUSTICE THROUGH SIMPLIFIED LEGAL
PROCEDURE, 73 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOc. SCI. 196, 202 (1917):
The court could practically say: "Now on this issue are you seriously going to
dispute the fact? As a reasonable man, are you denying it?" If he answers
"Perhaps it is so, but, let the other side prove it," it ought to be possible for the
court to throw his technical objections out of the window.
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to require that a mere denial of fact is not sufficient to put a fact in
dispute. A party in most cases must explicitly contest the fact asserted,
and if the fact asserted is known or could be known to the party, then the
party must substantiate its contrary contention with facts known to it.
Thus, if in the course of the hearing or in the pleadings, one party admits
a fact asserted by the other, there is no need to prove the fact. In
relatively short order the judge can inform the parties of the applicable
legal rules and get their agreement on which matters of fact are material
to those rules and are in dispute.
(3) Focusing Witness Testimony
Thanks to such structuring, many cases conclude without oral
testimony of witnesses ever being necessary. Judges I spoke with
estimated that this may be true of well more than half of all cases filed.
Where witness testimony is taken, framing issues helps focus and
expedite the testimony that is taken.
When it comes to taking the testimony of witnesses, German civil
justice is just-in-time justice. The judge takes evidence only on party
request and only after the judge so orders. 23 The judge is to order taking
evidence only when necessary to convince the judge of the truth or
untruth of a particular fact that is disputed by the parties and that is
material to the judge's decision of the case. Thus, the judge should not
take evidence to prove undisputed facts, facts generally known to the
judge, facts presumed by statute to be true until the contrary is proven,
favorable facts established by the other party's submissions, disputed
main facts established by undisputed facts, disputed facts the truth of
which the judge is convinced of without taking evidence, and facts not
necessary for the judgment (e.g., two alternatives for granting relief are
allowed and one is already acknowledged).
The judge's control of evidence taking does not, however, prevent
parties from insisting on taking evidence that they believe is relevant to
deciding material issues in dispute. German judges told me that one of
the surest ways to ensure that a lower court is reversed on appeal is to
reject an application to take evidence without strong justification. Such
refusal counts as a violation of the judge's ZPO § l39 duty of elucidation
discussed in the next subsection.
23. John Langbein has written eloquently of The German Advantage in Civil
Procedure, 52 u. CHI. L. REv. 823 (1985). His main theme is that "by assigning judges
rather than lawyers to investigate the facts, the Germans avoid the most troublesome
aspects of our practice." /d. at 824. His article led to a flurry of discussion that has
continued over twenty years. A recent review can be found in Bradley Bryan, Justice
and Advantage in Civil Procedure: Langbein's Conception of Comparative Law and
Procedural Justice in Question, II TULSA J. COMPo & INT'L L. 521, 523 (2004).
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(4) Deferring Final Decision of Issues

Case structuring and issue framing work as powerful tools for
promoting efficient conduct of civil justice because German judges can
and do defer final decisions of individual aspects of cases until they are
prepared to decide the case as a whole. German judges decide no issues
before their time. 24 The critical moment in a German lawsuit is how law
applies to facts as of the last oral hearing. German parties do not have to
commit irrevocably early in the lawsuit to a single theory of the case.
While judges are authorized to reject evidence for being offered too late,
and often do that, their enthusiasm for such expediting measures is
tempered by their ever-present ZPO § 139 duty of elucidation which
assures the parties their constitutional right to be heard guaranteed by the
German Constitution. 25 ZPO § 139 is a far-reaching prescription that the
judge thoroughly discuss all aspects of the case with the parties. It
completely rules out trial by ambush. ZPO § 139(2) requires that the
judge call to a party's attention and give the party an opportunity to
comment on any non-trivial issue that the party has apparently
overlooked or has considered insignificant or where the judge's
understanding of the point of fact or law differs from the understanding
of the parties.
German civil procedure seeks in this way to sequence issue deciding
in a manner that is both efficient and just. In many cases, the applicable
legal rule can not simply be read from the statute. Instead, it is often it
necessary to search the statute for the rule, to compare the rule to the
facts, to revisit the statute in light of the facts, and to examine the facts
again in light of the rules. This process of going back and forth was
identified in the first part of the twentieth century and has since assumed
a place in the description oflaw application in Germany?6
AMERICAN REFLECTIONS ON THE GERMAN RELATIONSTECHNIK

The ideals that undergird the German Relationstechnik are no
strangers to American civil justice. For much of the 20 th century the
Canons of Judicial Ethics of the American Bar Association stated as a
tenet of the rule of the law that the judge's "duty is the application of

24. Paul Masson advertising slogan "We will sell no wine before its time." See, e.g.,
Paul Masson Commercial Featuring Orson Welles, available at http://www.youtube.coml
watch?v=bpjOt2ozPWY (last visited Sept. 19,2009).
25. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. I 03 (F.R.G.).
26. See OSKAR HARTWIEG & HANS ALBRECHT HESSE: DIE ENTSCHEIDUNG 1M
ZIVILPROZESS: EIN STUDIENBUCH OBER METHODE, RECHTSGEFUHL UNO ROUTINE IN
GUTACHTEN UNO URTEIL 78-79 (1981) (Die Lehre vom Pendelblick).
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general law to particular instances.,,27 The idea that civil procedure
should guide deciding anchored our civil justice system throughout the
19th century. Stephen on Pleading, the most often printed of all one
volume treatises on civil procedure of that century, famously begins: "In
the course of administering justice between litigating parties there are
two successive objects,-to ascertain the subject for decision, and to
decide.,,28 Proponents of narrative litigation acknowledge that even
today the received view of the American trial describes an underlying
substance29 that seems to me scarcely different from the
Relationstechnik: (1) construct an accurate, value-free account of what
occurred, (2) fairly categorize whether that account fits within the
substantive law, and (3) deliver a verdict that the party with the burden of
proof has established each of the elements of the claim.
American civil procedure has, however, never enjoyed the success
of the German Relationstechnik. It has swung from one extreme to the
other-from allowing parties to dispute only one point of law or fact, as
was the case in common law special pleading, to allowing parties to put
forth all manner of claims constrained only slightly by statutory law. To
keep the trial in bounds and to prevent unfair surprise, special pleading
precluded parties from addressing all but one issue. To remedy the ills
that followed from premature issue narrowing, the system introduced
contemporary discovery to assure that parties did not narrow issues with
incomplete knowledge. But the cure was worse than the ill; few cases
can support complete discovery.
The inability of American civil procedure to narrow issues without
cutting off consideration of matters later found to be material has
rendered American civil procedure a failure. Contemporary American
27. CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS, Canon 20 (1924). From 1924 to 1972 the
American Bar Association's Canon 20 provided:
A judge should be mindful that his duty is the application of general law to
particular instances, that ours is a government of law and not of men, and that
he violates his duty as a minister of justice under such a system if he seeks to
do what he may personally consider substantial justice in a particular case and
disregards general law as he knows it to be binding on him.
[d. These canons remained in force until the Code of Judicial Conduct was adopted
August 16, 1972. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Preface (1990).
28. HENRY JOHN STEPHEN, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL
ACTIONS I (Philadelphia, Abraham Small, 1824). The first American edition appeared in
the year of the first edition in London, 1824. Before the Civil War, there were six
subsequent editions by Francis J. Troubat. After the Civil War there were many more
editions by different editors, among them one by that icon of the common law, Samuel
Williston in 1895. Other editions included those by Franklin Fiske Heard (1867), Samuel
Tyler (multiple editions from 1871 to 1919), and James DeWitt Andrews (multiple
editions 1894-190 I). It was epitomized in other books. It was the 19th century
American guide to common law pleading. The last American edition appeared in 1924.
29. Bums, supra note IS.
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civil justice cannot do efficiently and justly that which the public rightly
expects of it: apply law to facts to detennine rights.
Common law special pleading and contemporary discovery have
one thing in common: both rely on the good will of the parties' attorneys
to narrow the issues. Problematic in any system, such an approach is
especially dubious in an adversary system, particularly in an adversary
system such as has developed in the United States, where the bar is
diverse and open rather than limited and closed as it had been in
England.
When the nineteenth century refonners contemplated abolition of
common law pleading, some also contemplated shifting responsibility for
issue narrowing from the parties to a neutral magistrate as in classical
Roman law. Aware of the possibility, but apparently not familiar with a
working system of such narrowing, they hesitated to import a "foreign
style of architecture." Instead, they chose to try first to "build with old
materials and after the old fashions.,,3o They tried. April 12, 2008, was
the 160th anniversary of New York legislature's adoption of the Field
Code. It is still the symbolic cornerstone of the rickety system we have
today. Six generations of failure are enough; it is time for change.
Knowledge of Gennan Relationstechnik should infonn that change. 31

30. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS ApPOINTED To REVISE AND REFORM
THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE COURT OF JUSTICE IN THIS COMMONWEALTH (1851), reprinted in
2 A MEMOIR OF BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS WITH SOME OF HIS PROFESSIONAL AND
MISCELLANEOUS WRITING 159 (Benjamin R. Curtis, Jr. ed., 1879).
31. The acceptance of special pleading in 19th century America dispels the idea that
present-day story-writing procedures are mandated by the constitutional requirement of
trial by jury. All that the Constitution requires is a jury trial of disputed issues of material
fact. For the place of the Relationstechnik in German civil procedure generally, see
JAMES R. MAXEINER, GYOOHO LEE & ARMIN WEBER, PRACTICAL GLOBAL CIVIL
PROCEDURE: UNITED STATES, GERMANY & KOREA (forthcoming 2010).
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